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Abstract—The telecommunication world keeps evolving, with
the development of new technologies, and operators have to
wonder if investing in the costly infrastructures and potential
licenses as well as maintaining existing technologies is worthy.
This has to be investigated in a competitive context. We propose
in this paper to model and analyze a three-level game between two
operators. At the highest level operators decide which technology
to implement, possibilities being here 3G, WiFi and WiMAX.
At the intermediate level, they fix their service price, while
at the lowest level, customers choose their provider depending
on price and quality of service. The model is analyzed by
backward induction, where decisions at a level depend on the
equilibria at the lower levels. Different real-life cost scenarios
are studied, depending on whether or not operators already
own the infrastructures and licenses: our model should help
understanding their final decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Competition among telecommunication providers is fierce.
Providers do not only compete for customers by playing on
their price and offered quality of service (QoS) but, due to the
so-called convergence with terminals supporting multiple in-
terfaces, they also have to choose which technology to operate.
That issue is of increasing interest with the introduction of new
interfaces and the possibility to get a license, such as currently
with WiMAX [1] or LTE. The questions an operator should
then ask itself are the following: is it worth paying a license
and an infrastructure for being present in the new technology?
Will it help to attract more customers, but then isn’t it at
the expense of other technologies already implemented? This
has to be decided given the current positions (and forecasted
decisions) of competitors, which also aim at maximizing their
revenue. Another typical illustration comes from the third gen-
eration wireless licenses in France where the regulator wants to
open a fourth license to increase competition. Candidates have
to ponder the total cost with the revenue they will get from
customers. This paper aims at helping with such decisions,
not only for the operator but additionally for the regulator to
define the appropriate license fees.
The model we present is made of three levels, corresponding
to three different time scales. At the lowest level, given fixed
operated technologies and service costs, customers spread
themselves among available operators in order to get the
“best" combination of price and QoS, where the QoS (or the
congestion) they get depends on the choice of the other users.
We assume that users are infinitesimal, so that the (selfish)
decision of a single individual does not have any influence
on the system behavior. The equilibrium analysis is therefore
provided by the so-called Wardrop’s principle [2]. This equi-
librium is for fixed prices, but providers determine beforehand
(by backward induction) what the resulting equilibrium (and
therefore their revenue) would be for a given price profile,
and play the corresponding pricing game accordingly. This
constitutes the second level of game, the general framework
being again that of non-cooperative game theory, and the
equilibrium notion, the Nash equilibrium [3], with atomic
players here. Finally, at a larger time scale, providers can
decide which technologies to operate. In order to make that
decision, they have to compute what their revenue would be at
the equilibrium or equilibria (if any) of the lower-level pricing
game, and compare it with their costs. That choice, which also
depends on the strategy of competitors, will be made in order
to reach again a Nash equilibrium for this “technology game".
While users’ distribution among providers and pricing
games have been quite extensively studied [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], there is to our knowledge no other paper dealing
with the technology game, especially using the result of the
pricing game. Other multilevel games exists, the most notable
one being [10], but it rather models the interactions between
Internet service providers and content providers. Our goal
is here to answer the question about which technology a
provider should implement, given the potential revenue and
the potential infrastructure and license costs. We have not seen
elsewhere this kind of study in a similar competitive context.
We also provide typical and real-life competition situations of
providers already installed but which could try to extend their
technological range to increase their revenue.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
describe the mathematical model and three levels of game
for its analysis. Section III describes the user game, char-
acterizing the (Wardrop) equilibrium. Section IV is devoted
to the intermediate game on prices. it considers an average
coverage zone and reviews the capacities for the different
wireless technologies. Based on those numbers, the revenues
at the equilibrium of the pricing game are displayed for each
combination of technologies implemented by the providers.
Section V relates those revenues with implementation costs
representative of real-life competition among provider. This
leads to a technological game that is solved and analyzed for
each considered specific scenario.
II. MODEL
Consider N providers in competition for customers (later
on, we will take N = 2, but we keep the model description
as general as possible). Each provider has to decide which set
of technologies it will operate. There is a set T of available
technologies, basically for us
T = {3G, WiMAX, WiFi}.
This set is partitionned into two subsets Tp and Ts: for
the technologies in Tp(= {3G, WiMAX}), each operating
provider owns a license and a part of the radio spectrum,
using it alone. On the other hand, for a technology in Ts
(Ts = {WiFi} for us), the spectrum is shared by the customers
of the competing providers. Define also Si as the set of
technologies operated by i.
We assume that each provider i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) prespecifies a
price pi per unit of flow that a customers needs to pay if using
its network. This price pi is the same whatever the technology
used by customers at provider i. We also assume that users
have terminals with multiple interfaces, allowing them to use
any technology, and that they can sense the available QoS. As
a consequence, they can choose the technology and provider
offering the best combination of price and QoS.
Formally, let di,t be the flow demand experienced at technol-
ogy t by provider i, and d the vector of all flow demands. QoS
is modeled by a congestion function ℓi,t(di,t) for technology
t ∈ Tp operated by provider i, and ℓt(
∑
j dj,t) for t ∈ Ts,
functions being assumed nonnegative, continuous and strictly
increasing in terms of the total. Customers try to minimize
their perceived price at technology t and provider i, defined
by
p¯i,t(d) =


pi + ℓi,t(di,t) if t ∈ Tp
pi + ℓt

∑
j
dj,t

 if t ∈ Ts. (1)
This means that the perceived price is a linear combination
of a monetary cost (the price charged) and a QoS cost (the
congestion level). This model extends the one proposed in [4],
since here different technologies can be operated by a single
provider, and some can also be shared.
We also assume that total user demand is a continuous func-
tion D(·) of the perceived price p¯, strictly decreasing continu-
ous on its support and differentiable, with limp→∞D(p) = 0.
The system is characterized by by three different time
scales:
• at the shortest scale, for fixed prices and sets of offered
technologies, users choose their provider and technology
in order to minimize their perceived price. Customers are
assume non-atomic. This leads to a user equilibrium sit-
uation (d∗i,t)i,t following the Wardrop’s principle, where
for all technologies with positive demand, the perceived
price is the same, other technologies have higher larger
perceived prices (otherwise some users would have an
interest to change to a cheaper option).
• At the intermediate time scale, providers compete for
customers by playing with prices for fixed sets of im-
plemented technologies. The goal of each provider i is to
maximize its revenue
Ri =
∑
t∈Si
pid
∗
i,t, (2)
playing on price pi and making use of what the user equi-
librium d∗ = (d∗i,t)i,t would be for a given price profile.
Since the revenue of a provider depends on the price
strategy of competitors (through the user equilibrium),
this is analyzed using non-cooperative game theory.
• At the larger time scale, providers have to chose which
technologies to invest on. This is again analyzed thanks
to non-cooperative game theory, using the equilibrium
situation (p∗i )1≤i≤N of the intermediate level.The goal is
here again to optimize
Ri =
∑
t∈Si
p∗i d
∗
i,t − ci,t
(where ci,t represents the license and infrastructure costs
to provider i to operate on technology t), by playing with
the set Si.
III. THE USER LEVEL
The outcome of the interactions among nonatomic users
should follow Wardrop’s principle [2]: only cheapest options
are chosen, and total demand corresponds to that cheap-
est price. Formally, given a technology configuration S =
(S1, ..., SN ) and a price configuration (p1, ..., pN ), a Wardrop
equilibrium is a tuple (d1,1..., dN,|SN |) of positive real num-
bers such that

∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ Si p¯i,t =


pi + ℓi,t(d
∗
i,t) if t ∈ Tp
pi + ℓt(
∑
j:t∈Sj
d∗j,t) if t ∈ Ts
∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ Si d
∗
i,t > 0 =⇒ p¯i,t = min
j∈N ,τ∈Sj
(p¯j,τ )
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈Si
d∗i,t = D( min
i∈N ,t∈Si
(p¯i,t))
(3)
The first equality gives the perceived price for each pair
(operator, technology), the second one states that users choose
the cheapest options, and the last one comes from the demand-
price relation.
The nonatomic game that is played among users falls into
the widely-studied set of routing games [11], [12], [13].
Indeed, the user problem can be interpreted as finding a route
(i.e., a pair provider-technology) to reach the global internet,
while congestion effects occur. Several powerful results exist
for that kind of games, that we apply to prove existence and
uniqueness of a user equilibrium for our particular problem.
Proposition 1: There always exists a user equilibrium.
Moreover, the corresponding perceived price at each provider-
technology pair (i, t) is unique.
Proof: Since all congestion functions are strictly increas-
ing and demand at price 0 is strictly positive, then at an
equilibrium all perceived prices are strictly positive. Then
the existence of a Wardrop equilibrium directly comes from
Theorem 5.4 in [12] (just a few extra verifications are needed
for the specific - and unrealistic - case where some providers
set their price to 0).
For a Wardrop equilibrium, we denote by p¯ the common
perceived price of all options (i.e., pairs provider-technology)
that get positive demand. Assume there exist two Wardrop
equilibria d and dˆ with different perceived prices, say p¯ and
ˆ¯p, and assume without loss of generality that p¯ > ˆ¯p. Since
the demand function is strictly decreasing on its support, then
total demand for d is strictly smaller than for dˆ. This means
that either total demand on one of the shared technologies,
or demand on one proprietary technology of a provider, is
strictly smaller for d than for dˆ. But following Wardrop’s
principle, this would mean that the corresponding cost for that
technology is the minimal cost ˆ¯p for dˆ, that is strictly larger
(due to congestion cost increasingness) than for d, itself being
larger than p¯, a contradiction. As a result, the perceived price
p¯ for options with demand is unique, and we necessarily have
for each provider-technology pair (i, t):
t ∈ Tp ⇒ p¯i,t = max(p¯, pi + ℓi,t(0))
t ∈ Ts ⇒ p¯i,t = pi +max(p¯− pt, ℓt(0)),
where p
t
= min{pi, t ∈ Si}. All perceived prices are unique,
which concludes the proof.
IV. THE PRICING GAME
In this section, we propose to analyze the pricing game in
the case of two providers whatever the subset of technologies
in {3G, WiMAX, WiFi} each of them implements. Providers
aim at maximizing their revenue.
We assume that a set of users is positioned in a predefined
zone and that all users have a terminal with multiple interfaces.
We have in mind a specific zone covered by a 3G UMTS base
station in France (composed of about 104 such zones). We
additionally assume that the zone is covered by a WiFi 802.11g
access point and a single 802.16e (WiMAX) base station. In
our numerical application, we will choose realistic values of
demand and capacities, and will only consider downlink for
convenience. The realistic capacity values we consider are
• 28 Mb/s per operator for 3G [14];
• 40 Mb/s, still in downlink, for WiMAX technology [15];
• 25 Mb/s for WiFi [16].
We moreover assume the demand function D to be linear,
given by (in Mb/s)
D(p¯) = 300− 3p¯,
with p¯ in e/month. Hence no user is willing to pay more than
100 e monthly to benefit from the service. In our numerical
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Fig. 1. Curves of best prices if both players propose the WiMax technology
computations, the congestion function ℓi,t of a couple demand-
technology (i, t) is supposed to be the average waiting time
of a M/M/1 queue of parameters (di,t, Ci,t) if the technology
t belongs to the set Tp, and of parameters (
∑
t∈Si
di,t, Ct) if
t belongs to Ts. Recall that the average waiting time of an
M/M/1 queue with parameters (λ, µ) is 1/(µ− λ)− 1/µ.
Using those parameters, we investigate numerically for
each couple of technology sets (S1,S2) the existence of a
Nash equilibrium on the price war. Recall too that a Nash
equilibrium is a price profile (p∗
1
, p∗
2
) such that ∀p1, p2 ≥ 0
R1(p
∗
1
, p∗
2
) ≥ R1(p1, p
∗
2
) and R2(p
∗
1
, p∗
2
) ≥ R2(p
∗
1
, p2). In
words, no provider can improve its revenue by deviating
unilaterally. In our numerical computations, we have always
found that for any technology profile where shared technolo-
gies are operated by only one provider, there exists a unique
non-null Nash equilibrium. However, proving analytically the
existence and uniqueness of such a Nash equilibrium would
deserve more work. To illustrate how those Nash equilibria
are found, consider for instance the case where the two
operators decide to propose only a WiMAX access to the users.
Figure 1 displays the best responses (i.e., prices maximizing
their revenue) of providers in terms of the price of the other. A
Nash equilibrium is an intersection point of those two curves.
One can check that there exists a single non-null intersection
point between the two curves, here approximately equal to
(72.5, 72.5).
Table I displays the monthly revenues in euros of operators
at the (non-null, if any) Nash price profile, for every technol-
ogy profile. It is noticeable that the revenue is null for the
two operators in a configuration in which they both choose
the WiFi technology. This observation can be interpreted
intuitively: if both providers implement WiFi, consider a non-
null price profile. For a provider, it is always worthy to price
just below the competitor to attract all the WiFi users and then
increase its revenue. But this is also valid for the competitor,
so that we end up with a price profile (0, 0).
V. ILLUSTRATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL GAMES
In the previous section, we have seen how, whatever the set
of technologies implemented by the providers, an equilibrium
can be reached in the pricing game, with revenues from
1 \2 ∅ 3G WiMAX 3G,WiMAX WiFi WiFi,3G WiFi,WiMAX WiFi,3G,WiMAX
∅ 0;0 0;2470 0;3379 0;5081 0;2228 0;4220 0;4921 0;6193
3G 2470;0 2200;2220 2090;3022 1843;4506 2241;1985 1970;3752 1859;4367 1623;5415
WiMAX 3379;0 3022;2090 2864;2864 2489;4240 3061;1887 2689;3545 2532;4112 2192;5043
3G,WiMAX 5081;0 4506;1843 4240;2489 3638;3638 4572;1666 3957;3079 3691;3538 3092;4232
WiFi 2228;0 1985;2241 1887;3061 1666;4572 0;0 0;0 0;0 0;0
WiFi,3G 4220;0 3752;1970 3545;2689 3079;3957 0;0 0;0 0;0 0;0
WiFi,WiMAX 4921;0 4367;1859 4112;2532 3538;3691 0;0 0;0 0;0 0;0
WiFi,3G,WiMAX 6193;0 5415;1623 5043;2192 4232;3092 0;0 0;0 0;0 0;0
TABLE I
REVENUES MATRIX (FROM USERS) FOR PROVIDERS DEPENDING ON THE IMPLEMENTED TECHNOLOGIES
customers displayed in Table I. We now aim at investigating
for different scenarios the outcome of the game on tech-
nologies. As in the previous section, we consider a zone
(typical of France) covered by a single base station, for a
period of one month. Estimated infrastructure plus license
costs, if any, will therefore be divided by the approximately
104 zones in France and by the duration in months of the
license rights. Let ci,t be the per zone and per month cost
at provider i for technology t. The total technological cost at
each provider is assumed additive, that is the cost total cost
of provider i is ci,Si =
∑
t∈Si
ci,t. This yields a cost matrix
((c1,S1 , c2,S2))S1,S2⊂T . Subtracting it to the revenue matrix
of Table I, we get a net benefits (or utility) matrix that can
be analyzed to determine if there is a Nash equilibrium at this
largest time scale.
A. Symmetric game
For this first real-life scenario, we consider two incoming
providers with symmetric costs. We assume the following
costs: 3G license for 10 years of 649 Me [17], and in-
frastructure cost of 1.4 Be[18]. The license cost (resp. the
infrastructure cost) is then evaluated to 541 e (resp. 1167 e)
per month and per zone, giving c1,3G = c2,3G = 1708 e. We
also assume that a license costs 649 Me for WiMAX and
the infrastructure costs 340 Me [19], yielding c1,WiMAX =
c2,WiMAX = 541+283 = 824 e. We assume that every access
point is renewed each year and is bought at the average price
of 600 e. As no license purchase is necessary for the WiFi
[20], we get then c1,WiFi = c2,WiFi = 50 e.
In that case, we can remark that there exists again
two Nash equilibria, ({WiFi,WiMAX},{WiMAX}) and
({WiMAX},{WiFi,WiMAX}). With respect to the previous
situation, 3G is actually too expensive with the proposed
license cost to be implemented.
B. A WiFi-positionned provider against a 3G one
Consider provider 1 as already installed in the Internet and
WiFi (basically like the provider called Free in France), and
wishing to extend its position, against a 3G-installed provider 2
(Bouygues Telecom for instance). WiMAX costs are assumed
to be the same as in the previous subsection, this technology
being a new one. Bouygues Telecom already owning an
infrastructure, only its license cost of 649 Me accounts, giving
c2,3G = 541 e. The cost of the fourth license in France is fixed
to 240 Me [17], and of the new infrastructure estimated at 1.0
Be [18], so that c1,3G = 1033 e per month and per site. For
WiFi, we choose c1,WiFi = 0 e and c2,WiFi = 50 e to illustrate
the better position of provider 1. The benefits matrix is given
in Table II, with again best responses highlighted in bold. For
this game, there are two non symetric Nash equilibria. The
first one is ({WiFi,WiMAX},{3G,WiMAX}). Indeed, each
operator chooses the technology on which it is already present,
and additionally goes to the new WiMAX technology. The
second Nash equilibrium is ({WiMAX},{WiFi,3G,WiMAX})
and corresponds to a situation where operator 2 proposes
all technologies and operator 1 only proposes the WiMAX
technology. Again, it is better not to fight on (the low-cost)
WiFi. To have a Nash equilibrium with 3G implemented by
provider 1, then the cost c1,3G has to be reduced to 900 e,
which would mean a license fee of 67 e (or equivalently
a global 3G license selling price of 80 Me). In that case,
the situation ({3G,WiMAX},{WiFi,3G,WiMAX}) would be a
Nash equilibrium of the technological game: provider 1 would
focus on licensed technologies, giving up on WiFi. On the
other hand, if the monthly cost per site for 3G gets as low as
694 e, then provider 1 could keep operating WiFi, since the
situation ({WiFi,3G,WiMAX},{3G,WiMAX}) would arise as
a technological Nash equilibrium.
C. A single technology-positionned provider against a domi-
nant one
This would for instance correspond in France to Free
(strongly established in the Internet and WiFi networks),
named provider 1 again, against Orange, named provider 2, al-
ready positionned on almost all technologies, except WiMAX,
for which we keep the costs of previous subsections. The 3G
costs are also considered the same as in the previous subsec-
tion, but WiFi costs are here the same, c1,WiFi = c2,WiFi = 0 e
due to the presence of both providers on this technology.
The results are displayed in Table III. One can see here that,
again, two Nash equilibria exist and are similar to those of
the previous game in part V-B. That is, the existence of the
WiFi infrastructure for the provider 2 plays does not affect
the Nash equilibria. Hence, we deduce that the impact of the
WiFi infrastructure cost is negligible compared to the 3G and
WiMAX license and infrastructure costs. As in the previous
subsection, some conditions on the license fees can be derived
for 3G to be deployed by operators at a Nash equilibrium.
1 \2 ∅ 3G WiMAX 3G,WiMAX WiFi WiFi,3G WiFi,WiMAX WiFi,3G,WiMAX
∅ 0;0 0;1929 0;2555 0;3716 0;2178 0;3629 0;4047 0;4778
3G 1437;0 1167;1679 1057;2198 810;3141 1208;1935 937;3161 826;3493 590;4000
WiMAX 2555;0 2198;1549 2040;2040 1665;2875 2237;1837 1865;2954 1708;3238 1368;3628
3G,WiMAX 3224;0 2649;1302 2383;1665 1781;2273 2715;1616 2100;2488 1834;2664 1235;2817
WiFi 2228;0 1985;1700 1887;2237 1666;3207 0;-50 0;-591 0;-874 0;-1415
WiFi,3G 3187;0 2719;1429 2512;1865 2046;2592 -1033;-50 -1033;-591 -1033;-874 -1033;-1415
WiFi,WiMAX 4097;0 3543;1318 3288;1708 2714;2326 -824;-50 -824;-591 -824;-874 -824;-1415
WiFi,3G,WiMAX 4336;0 3558;1082 3186;1368 2375;1727 -1857;-50 -1857;-591 -1857;-874 -1857;-1415
TABLE II
BENEFITS MATRIX FOR THE WIFI-3G GAME
1 \2 ∅ 3G WiMAX 3G,WiMAX WiFi WiFi,3G WiFi,WiMAX WiFi,3G,WiMAX
∅ 0;0 0;1929 0;2555 0;3716 0;2228 0;3679 0;4097 0;4828
3G 1437;0 1167;1679 1057;2198 810;3141 1208;1985 937;3211 826;3543 590; 4050
WiMAX 2555;0 2198;1549 2040;2040 1665;2875 2237;1887 1865;3004 1708;3288 1368;3678
3G,WiMAX 3224;0 2649;1302 2383;1665 1781;2273 2715;1666 2100;2538 1834;2714 1235;2867
WiFi 2228;0 1985;1700 1887;2237 1666;3207 0;0 0;-541 0;-824 0;-1365
WiFi,3G 3187;0 2719;1429 2512;1865 2046;2592 -1033;0 -1033;-541 -1033;-824 -1033;-1365
WiFi,WiMAX 4097;0 3543;1318 3288;1708 2714;2326 -824;0 -824;-541 -824;-824 -824;-1365
WiFi,3G,WiMAX 4336;0 3558;1082 3186;1368 2375;1727 -1857;0 -1857;-541 -1857;-824 -1857;-1365
TABLE III
BENEFITS MATRIX FOR THE WIFI-DOMINANT GAME
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a 3-stage model to study competi-
tion among telecommunication providers. Providers have two
strategic decisions to make (namely, the price they sell the
service and the set of technologies to operate) on different
time scales, while users react to those decisions.
The model provides some insights about the conditions un-
der which a technology can be chosen by providers. Through
some numerical computations, we highlighted that regulatory
decisions such as license fees can strongly affect the outcome
of the noncooperative interaction among providers.
Future work could focus on those regulatory issues, and
possibly exhibit some specific regulatory decisions which
would favor the development of some given technologies in a
country.
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